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Criminalizing “Pro-Immigrant” Initiatives: Reducing the Space of Human Action 
The article addresses the problem of the surveillance, disciplining and criminalization 
of practices of non-governmental initiatives which offer help to irregular migrants, 
asylum seekers and refugees in Slovenia and four neighbouring countries. Based on 
original empirical work – interviews with members of NGOs – it analyses the dynamic 
of these processes through several stages of the “continuum of criminalization”. Five 
types of crimmigration policies and practices of authorities and other actors were 
identified which produce cumulative effects and reduce space for both political and 
human action as well as spontaneity.
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INTRODUCTION
The year 2015, when the so-called refugee crisis took place in the EU and the Bal-
kans, brought about the breakdown of European refugee policy (Žagar, Kogovšek 
Šalamon, Lukšič Hacin 2018), after which increasingly restrictive, militaristic and an-
ti-humanitarian measures were adopted. However, in parallel with the wave of ref-
ugees in the “long summer of migration”, a wave of solidarity also emerged. Some 
citizens did not miss the chance to act in genuine human solidarity and to show the 
potential to counter the “main stream” of crimmigration (Kogovšek Šalamon 2017: 
261). Multiple actors were present in solidarity actions and campaigns with refugees, 
which varied from more traditional humanitarian to ad hoc campaigns, and from lo-
cal solidarity groups to transnational endeavours (Della Porta 2018: 25; Fekete 2017). 
While these activities have mostly been “filling the gap” where the states have failed, 
due to a systematic policy of neglect, they soon became the object of intense “state 
harassment” (Fekete 2017: 66) and criminalization (Webber 2017).
The criminalization of aid to refugees is not a new phenomenon (Fekete 2017: 2). 
It was a regular practice in all regimes which were proto- or entirely totalitarian. Luck-
ily, to date, there have always been people who have continued to practice human 
solidarity, even in dark times and at the price of their own freedom or life. As I have 
argued elsewhere, one of the main characteristics of proto-totalitarian governments 
is that they increasingly produce the phenomenon of “double superfluousness” 
(Jalušič 2017). Not only do they make superfluous those people who are seen as rad-
ically unequal and are as such exposed to inhuman treatment (refugees, foreigners, 
migrants), they also produce the dehumanization and superfluousness of their own 
citizenry by attempting to destroy their capacities and framework for agency, and 
hence their spontaneity and politics. In the circumstances of a “normal”, democratic 
political order, humanitarian action is usually not political, as Arendt would claim. 
Being an expression of compassion, it can easily be perverted into pity (Arendt 1982: 
88–90). Nevertheless, such action can become political in extreme conditions when 
politics as human activity and the space for human action are endangered or on the 
way to being destroyed.
This thought has led me to rethinking the contemporary criminalization of hu-
man solidarity and advocacy work for unwanted, irregular migrants. Of particular 
interest is the question of why the criminalization of solidarity with migrants, such 
as advocacy, and even the criminalization of “pure” humanitarian aid, is taking place 
right now. The article draws upon original empirical research in four countries of 
“central and south-eastern” Europe conducted in 2017–2018. It adopts the frame-
work of crimmigration studies, which is outlined in the first two sections. The central 
part of the article presents findings and some conclusions of the analysis of inter-
views with representatives of ten non-governmental initiatives.
The empirical research was carried out as a part of the project Crimmigration 
between Human Rights and Surveillance (Peace Institute 2018) which also addressed 
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the impact of crimmigration processes on the principles of equality and rights, on 
human conduct, and on changes to the political and civic culture. We analysed the 
increasing trends of criminalizing humanitarian aid, while attention was given to 
practices of assistance and humanitarian interventions for migrants both within and 
outside of institutions, both formal and informal, in the EU, Slovenia and some coun-
tries of the Western Balkans. The main research question was not only what effect 
does the criminalization of migration have on the equality and rights of individual 
migrants, but also on general legal principles and on the role of the contemporary 
state and citizenship rights.
THE CRIMMIGRATION FRAMEWORK
Crimmigration is most generally understood as the merging of criminal and immi-
gration procedures and the corresponding policies, and the creating of special bor-
der regimes and a parallel legal system for the groups of undesirable migrants. The 
area of criminal law is conflated with that of migration management to the point 
where they have become “indistinct” (Stumpf 2006; Provera 2015). Provera defines 
the criminalization of migration as follows:
Criminalisation includes detention, discourse and criminal law measures directed to-
wards irregular migrants as well as identifying penalties which may be grounded in 
civil law. Criminalisation of migration means the adoption of criminal law character-
istics in immigration enforcement and the adoption of immigration consequences 
for criminal law infractions. (Provera 2015: i)
Four main steps in the process of criminalization of migration can be identified from 
the crimmigration literature. The first step is discursive creation of migrants as prima 
facie criminal suspects (Parkin 2016; Guild 2010). The second is the legal definition 
of those who entered the state without a special permission (visas or even without 
documents) as “non-persons” or “illegals”, who are then subject to consequences of 
such “criminalization” in secondary law. This happens even if there is no legal basis 
for criminalization of persons who arrive on the territory without permission in the 
first place (Provera 2015). In spite of the lack of nexus between increases of the crime 
rate and intensification of migration, in the third step migrants as a whole are crim-
inalized due to this prima facie predisposition, and the so-called “criminal migrant” 
(Parkin 2016: 6) is thus constructed. Data show that even when the number of actual 
migrant crimes decreases, the number of migrants arrested increases (Parkin 2013). 
Finally, these policies gradually introduce control over the entire population, while 
at the same time criminalizing and penalizing not only acts of human “smuggling,” 
which is in fact always already a consequence of the definition of “crimes of arrival” 
(Webber 1996, 2008), but also acts of solidarity, such as basic assistance to migrants, 
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housing etc. (Provera 2015). Criminalization of migration clearly separates “foreign-
ers from citizens through an elision of administrative and criminal law language” 
and it subjects “the foreigner to measures which cannot be applied to citizens, such 
as detention without charge, trial or conviction”. Additionally, the criminalization of 
persons […] who engage with foreigners takes place. Individual human contact with 
foreigners “can be risky as it may result in criminal charges” (Guild 2010: 39).
In addition to severe human rights violations and phenomena of harmful social 
exclusion, the criminalization of persons who are seeking international protection, 
racial profiling, border violence, and mass deaths of migrants on the move (see Guild 
2010; European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 2014), there are also other grim 
consequences of these “trends”. State authorities sometimes act contrary to the law 
– contrary to both international human rights law and also the EU’s secondary leg-
islation, such as the European Charter on Human Rights (Provera 2015: 29), whereas 
the law itself changes its very character (Spena 2013). While initially the development 
of crimmigration law could have been seen as an “exceptional circumstance”, it has 
become increasingly normalized, and an increasingly acceptable “rule” among the 
majority of the countries’ populations. Exceptions to this include solidarity activities 
like those emerging along the humanitarian corridor on the Balkan refugee route in 
2015 and elsewhere (Fekete 2017; Della Porta 2018), including anti-crimmigration ex-
ceptions on the part of the authorities (Kogovšek 2017). But support, protests against 
crimmigration and assistance to migrants based on the principle of solidarity which 
established coalitions and succeeded with some demands (Provera 2015; Cantat 2015; 
Della Porta 2018) soon started becoming contentious and increasingly criminalized 
(Fekete 2009; Provera 2015; Della Porta 2018; Fekete 2017, Carrera et al. 2018).
In the long term, therefore, criminalization processes affect not only migrants 
and those who assist them, but also have implications for the present and future 
framework for action and the rights of the citizens of the states in question. Their 
“dynamics” change the existing system of government, which is considered to be 
democratic and respecting of equality, the rule of law, the separation of powers, and 
universal human rights.
CRIMINALIZATION OF ASSISTANCE TO IRREGULAR MIGRANTS
Most of the EU literature examining the legal framework of the criminalization of 
pro-migrant acts of solidarity proceeds from the “Facilitators’ Package”, which is 
regarded as the European-wide origin of the criminalization of humanitarian as-
sistance. It consisted of the EU Facilitation Directive, which enables and instructs 
the Member States to criminalize people who provide various kinds of assistance 
(transport, food and other necessities such as emergency shelter, etc.) to irregular 
migrants even without obtaining financial benefit, and does nothing to prohibit 
the criminalization of such people (see Parkin 2013; Provera 2015; Carrera et al. 2018; 
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Fekete 2009, 2017). While the directive allows the possibility of exempting human-
itarian assistance from sanction, it leaves the final decision to the Member States 
(Webber 2017; Carrera et al. 2018: 5). The later Framework Decision demanded the 
strengthening of penal sanctions by the member states, yet it included a reference 
to the 1951 Refugee Convention, which excludes punishment for the facilitation of 
entry for humanitarian assistance (FRA 2014: 9). The result was that in the one half of 
the EU member states, facilitation of entry is defined as a criminal offence which is 
punishable by either a prison sentence or a fine, whereas in the other half of the EU 
this is so even when the “smuggler” does not obtain any financial benefit (see Weber 
2017; Carrera et al. 2018: 6).
The implications of criminalizing the facilitation of entry and residence of irreg-
ular immigrants, without excepting humanitarian assistance, are grave. This became 
particularly clear when an open clash emerged between these policies and groups 
who provide humanitarian assistance, particularly in the cases of the actions of civil 
society groups carrying out search and rescue operations on the Mediterranean Sea, 
or in the cases of people who were providing social services and/or legal advice, for 
example in “hotspots” etc. The search and rescue missions were first directly accused 
of assisting the smuggler networks and of becoming a “pull factor” for irregular mi-
gration, while they refused to cooperate with Frontex to report smuggling and sign 
the obligatory code of conduct (Carrera et al. 2018: 2–3, 14–18). A study produced for 
the European Parliament in 2016 clearly problematized the effects of the directive 
and the “failure to legislate for a clear exemption for humanitarian assistance”, which 
has resulted in a “high degree of legislative ambiguity and legal uncertainty” (Car-
rera, Guild, Aliverti et al. 2016: 62). Fear, intimidation and harassment by authorities 
were reported by civil society organizations, in addition to prosecutions and crimi-
nal convictions of individuals in some cases. There were court proceedings against 
people who had helped their family members enter the EU for personal and other 
altruistic reasons (ibid.: 63) and those who were “just providing food, water and shel-
ter ([…] sleeping bags) became a criminal problem” (Fekete 2017: 2). The criminaliza-
tion of assistance therefore brought about a general “climate of fear and insecurity 
regarding irregular immigration”. Furthermore, “the ‘citizen’s right to assist’ those 
in need of humanitarian aid as a key function of democracy” became jeopardized 
(Carrera, Guild, Aliverti et al. 2016: 63 ff).
A recent study on the criminalization of humanitarian assistance in Europe pre-
sents more than 45 cases of prosecution of individuals. All of them were doing pure 
humanitarian work and were just “filling the gap” in state provision (Fekete, Webber, 
Edmond Petit 2017). Yet within the framework of criminalization they were “targeted 
and harassed by the police”. Their activities were deemed “anti-social, a ‘pull factor’ 
encouraging migration and the nomadic existence at places like Calais and Ventimi-
glia.” Individual humanitarian workers were said to be “enablers of irregular migra-
tion” (Fekete 2017: 2). In September 2018, the former Slovenian minister of the interi-
or suggested that a Slovenian legal NGO was facilitating the influx of migrants from 
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Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina to Slovenia while they were providing migrants 
with information on their rights and helping them to enter the border procedures 
that are available to them according to law (Hočevar 2018; Bervar Sternad 2018).
In the context of crimmigration, individuals and organizations that perform 
acts of humanitarianism became a disturbing problem for the governments, which 
for years have used a “humanitarian approach” and “humanitarian reason” (Fassin 
2012) to govern global crises, wars, genocides, and lately also for border policing 
(Aas Franko, Gundhus 2015; Garelli, Tazzioli 2018). Backed by facilitation legislation, 
national governments such as Hungary and recently also Italy have clearly paved the 
path towards criminalizing humanitarian actions as well by defining a new type of 
new crime, “crimes of solidarity” (Fekete 2017: 1). Through such legislation the state 
authorities create hostile environments not only for migrants but also for individuals 
and organizations that work to counter the securitization of migration, fight for mi-
grants’ rights and do not allow themselves to be coordinated into the racist frame-
work (Edmond-Petit 2017; Fekete 2018: 68, 82).
Policies of criminalizing assistance to irregular immigrants “extend beyond cases 
where civil society actors have faced actual prosecutions and criminal convictions” 
(Carrera et al. 2018: 1). One of the worrying aspects is the “shrinking political space” 
for debate and action (Fekete 2017: 2), the narrowing of the legal framework for the 
agency of non-governmental actors and individuals, as the events in Poland and 
Hungary have shown (Szuleka 2018).
The concept of “policing the mobility society” was introduced by the latest re-
search on criminalization of solidarity in the EU (Carrera et al. 2018, 2018a) to explain 
the effects of the punitive dynamics on the civil society actors who are aiding mi-
grants, especially on those who are not providing “pure” humanitarian support like 
the big humanitarian organizations, and are transcending this framework through 
critical monitoring and/or political mobilization (Fekete 2017: 2). “Policing the mobil-
ity society” describes a “wider set of practices, mechanisms and tools driven by the 
logic of policing” and affecting both those on the move and those who mobilize and 
act “on behalf of immigrants and asylum seekers” (Carrera et al. 2018: 3). The term 
“mobility society” embraces not only traditional NGOs which “play a crucial role in 
service provision through EU and nationally funded programs and projects”, but also 
informal and loosely organized groups and individual activists (ibid.).
“Policing” stands for more than just traditional surveillance and prevention by 
police officers or border authorities. It embodies various actions of authorities and 
of several EU or national institutions that impact (directly or indirectly) the activities 
of civil society players. Three “faces” or stages of the “policing” actions are described 
as suspicion/intimidation, disciplining, and criminalization, while inaction and igno-
rance on the side of authorities was also described as “negative policing” (Carrera et 
al.: 3–4). The results of the entire study, which are forthcoming (Carrera et al. 2019), 
reveal broader processes of policing of three sets of civil society actors: search and 
rescue missions in the Mediterranean, those assisting irregular immigrants and asylum 
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seekers in accessing fundamental rights (shelter and food) and those advocating for 
their rights.
The conceptual framework of “policing” with three faces/phases is in many ways 
similar to what we have outlined in our project as several phases in the “continuum 
of criminalization”, although our findings pointed to more than just three instances/
types of criminalization. Besides, “policing” can also be carried out by other non-gov-
ernmental actors, especially the far right.
METHODOLOGY
In addition to an analysis of previous research and data on the criminalization of 
humanitarian assistance, we prepared a semi-structured qualitative questionnaire 
for representatives of NGOs offering humanitarian or other assistance to migrants 
that are active in Slovenia and neighbouring countries. The aim was to find out 
which organizations are being targeted by the criminalization trends, what kind of 
surveillance and punishment is used by authorities and other actors and how does 
this affect NGOs and citizens. The questionnaire consisted of five sets of questions, 
including those about the type of work and organization and whether they offer hu-
manitarian and/or other kinds of assistance. Questions were asked to assess trends in 
migration policies in their countries and the EU and to describe the observed crim-
inalization or other problematic practices of authorities toward irregular migrants 
and refugees.
Ten anonymous qualitative interviews were carried out from November 2017 to 
May 2018 with members, employees and volunteers of various civil society associ-
ations (NGOs) or more loosely organized groups from Slovenia (5) and four neigh-
bouring countries: Croatia (1) Austria (1), Hungary (2) and Italy (1). All or part of their 
work is dedicated to refugees, asylum seekers and irregular migrants, and can be 
considered as solidarity work (either humanitarian or broader).1 The main objective 
was to obtain a deeper insight (through the lens of the actors) into some of the most 
typical practices of policing and criminalization of both migrants and those who pro-
vide them with different types of assistance.
In the last part of the interviews the respondents were invited to talk about their 
organizations’ relationships with the authorities and about any cases of harassment, 
“policing” and criminalization of their or others actors’ work: had they ever been 
discredited, publicly criticized or defamed, had their work been obstructed, ig-
nored, or indirectly or directly criminalized, and how did that happen, had they 
1 Provera defines solidarity in a narrower sense as “providing, or assisting migrants to access, 
basic rights such as health care, accommodation, education, transport as well as necessities 
such as food and clothing” and ethically as “behaviour which might be considered humani-
tarian – that is, the individual or entity might consider their act to be ʻgoodʻ yet is otherwise 
subject to sanction” (Provera 2015: 5).
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been prosecuted, interrogated or otherwise charged, and had any of their or other 
actors’ activities or forms of assistance been prohibited by law or criminalized. The 
rest of the article focuses on the results and analysis of the last set of questions.
FINDINGS
All of the respondents had an intense experience with the so called “long summer of 
migration” in 2015–2016 and with the subsequent developments both in their coun-
tries and in the EU. During the crisis they engaged in border monitoring, providing 
information, and also humanitarian aid, including collecting and donating clothing, 
cooking and providing refugees with fresh food. Only two of the respondents see 
their organizations as mainly “humanitarian” and this should be understood in a 
broader sense as they also provide information, conduct monitoring, and provide ad-
vocacy, legal advice, basic rights counselling, etc. Others describe their work strictly 
as advocacy and legal representation, free legal help, monitoring, information pro-
vision, informing clients about procedures, representing them, etc. All of the organi-
zations generate knowledge, and produce studies, monitoring and research reports.
Migration Policies in the EU and in Member States
The respondents are highly critical of the EU’s policies and their governments’ 
measures, and assess them as “very, very restrictive”, “unwelcoming” (Slovenia), “ag-
gravating and rigid”, resembling a “Fortress Europe” approach (Croatia), and “really 
bad” (Hungary). Hungary in particular is identified as the leader in enforcing restric-
tive policies, by preventing arrivals and criminalizing and punishing irregular mi-
grants, including asylum seekers. Moreover, it incresingly criminalizes organizations 
helping migrants:
I don’t know if it can get lower than it already went. For several years, migration 
has been one of the main topics misused by the politicians to gain power, [and] the 
media report selectively, [and it] also produces disinformation. Non-governmental 
organizations are under serious preassure. If the Stop Soros laws2 are adopted we 
won’t be able to operate any more. (Interview 7; 4. 5. 2018)
2015/2016 marked a total breakdown of the EU’s migration policy, which could be 
interpreted as a “temporary win, [i.e.] success of migration”. After that, “the backlash 
of the EU border regime” took place and “the empire struck back” (Interview 6; 15. 
3. 2018). There is a close interrelation between restrictive Member State policies and 
2  Regarding the Stop Soros laws see Kingsley 2018.
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the direction received from the EU. The Hungarian “solution”, the respondents said, 
is widely tolerated only because the EU migration policy collapsed, and it is on this 
basis that the Hungarian government can afford “to do what they are doing” (“build-
ing fences, pushing people back, torturing them, beating them” (ibid.). Not only do 
“many countries in fact support Orban’s policy of banning migrants from the Bal-
kans” (Interview 7; 4. 5. 2018), it is also “in the EU’s interest to keep the corridor closed, 
and the Hungarian fence is an important element” of that (Interview 6; 15. 3. 2018).
This became more obvious when tackling the specific problematic practices af-
fecting migrants, and the unconstitutional conduct of the responsible authorities, 
which violate the European Convention on Human Rights and international law 
documents, or as one respondent said, they violate “everything” (Interview 7; 4. 5. 
2018). The “trend” which is moving further towards violence was unambiguously de-
scribed as follows:
[…] Croatian and Hungarian police forces in particular are not only pushing people 
back to Serbia on a regular basis […] with mass violence, regularly crossing the line 
of torture. All of this is well documented. But at the moment [...] nobody really cares. 
[…] I haven’t heard any criticism from Brussels regarding the mass violence that is 
happening. […] These stories […] are very systematic […], so anybody who looks 
into it more clearly knows what’s going on nowadays. It’s violently protecting the 
border. It all just shows that the fence is not enough. It was the same with the Berlin 
Wall. Think about the Berlin Wall without people to shoot. It would be absolutely 
useless […] I mean now we have a situation of immediate push-backs and this is 
connected to mass violence, so what else are they going to do? The next logical step 
is really to order them to shoot. (Interview 6; 15. 3. 2018)
Some respondents, not only Hungarian ones, whose organizations cooperate with 
authorities, noticed the deterioration of this relationship after 2015/2016. This pro-
cess went hand in hand with increased public attacks on them and with the attempts 
of the EU and Member states to limit the autonomous work of NGOs and individuals 
offering assistance. While it seemed that the most extreme of such developments 
took place in Hungary, other countries are no longer exceptions.
Types of Restrictions, Obstruction and Criminalization
We identified five types of practices and approaches aimed at obstructing or pre-
cluding the work and activities of non-governmental organizations, and thus nar-
rowing their space of agency.
a) Criticism and public attacks, discrediting of the work of NGOs in the media, disin-
formation, and harassment by right-wing politicians and their allies. “It was said that 
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we are importing migrants to Slovenia, work for them and take care for the migrants’ 
better lives instead of Slovenians’, and that we should take these migrants into our 
homes” (Interview 1; 4. 12. 2017). While these intimidations are not new, respondents 
the were criticized and exposed to harassment mostly by right-wing actors, and not 
mainly by the authorities, except in the Hungarian and Croatian cases. Direct attacks 
on NGOs, in Slovenia for example, were carried out by newspapers and one news 
portal connected to a right-wing party which is openly aligned with the Hungari-
an prime minister Orban. Organizations and individuals received threats via social 
media. Both in Slovenia and Croatia these attacks were aimed not solely at activities 
of solidarity with migrants but also at their work and civil society in general. There 
were numerous intersections between gender and migration. One Croatian NGO 
was publicly criticized by the authorities in a patronizing manner, even being ac-
cused of being anti-Croatian.
The attacks discredit the work of NGOs as incompetent, useless, dangerous and 
anti-state, and comment on the financial resources of these allegedly “rich” and cor-
rupt organizations, while the reports are not fact-based. A clear ideological pattern 
exists behind such accusations, in which they match a “suitable” enemy (Fekete 
2009) with a conspiracy theory. The Austrian respondent stated that many volun-
teers dealt with intimidation and hate speech, yet these did not come from officials.
Hungary faced the most powerful propaganda, where coordinated attacks by 
the media, right wing parties and the government stoked sentiments against NGOs 
that deal with migration or are financed by George Soros. Most media continual-
ly portrayed them as acting in opposition to the state interest, and dangerous to 
society; Soros’s agents and soldiers, who are jeopardizing Christian values and the 
safety of Hungarian citizens, want to fill Hungary with Muslims, and are connected to 
terrorists. The government even carried out open defamation of the NGOs under the 
cover of a quasi-deliberative democracy while sending citizens surveys with ques-
tions like “do you support organizations like the Hungarian Helsinki Committee and 
Amnesty International which are assisting terrorists”.
Respondents whose organizations were rarely or not criticized (2) thought that 
this was due to the nature of their work. They are “in a more favourable position” be-
cause their work is “primarily humanitarian and not advocacy-oriented” (Interview 
2; 7. 12. 2017). Or they are not at the centre of the pressure because the knowledge/
information their small organization collects is intended largely for NGOs and pro-
fessionals (Interview 6; 15. 3. 2018).
Slovenian and Croatian NGOs were targeted by demands that the governments 
cease all state funding of the NGOs, particularly those organizations which were or 
are financed by OSIFE. In Hungary, the government proposed taxing these organi-
zations up to 25%.
b) Bureaucratic tightening of the space for civic action: restricting access, obstructing 
of work and surveillance. The NGOs needed to be quite disciplined in their relationship 
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with the officials in order to get access to information or to be allowed to work at the 
border with migrants or in detention centres or transit zones. Respondents recall 
many instances where the authorities restricted or banned access to borders or de-
tention centres for activists, volunteers and various NGOs. They were often ignored, 
directly obstructed or punished for their endeavours, especially when they for exam-
ple entered the border area.
Obligatory registration with the large humanitarian organizations such as the 
Red Cross, Caritas or UNHCR, and restriction of access for those who assisted refu-
gees were the first steps of disciplining the work of NGOs in 2015/2016, at the time of 
the European refugee “crisis”. A Slovenian NGO faced restrictions from the Ministry 
of the Interior to access the parts of the refugee centres where the registration took 
place after they publicly criticized the observed violations of the Convention. The 
justification suggested that the NGOs were “not constructive enough”. The Ministry 
of the Interior apparently had very good information about which organizations had 
been critical.
I think that the authorities succeeded very quickly […] in pushing out all of the infor-
mal groups from the refugee centres with the argument that they only create chaos, 
but they basically wanted total surveillance of all forms of humanitarian aid. And 
that was how humanitarian work was performed later: in an automatic manner, very 
technical. So, if you are distributing food or clothes or you carry a box then that was 
humanitarian work, yet talking to the people, providing them with information, that 
was not humanitarian work anymore. And talking to people, and providing them 
with information, was the most unwelcome. (Interview 1; 4. 12. 2017)
However, it was not only about what kind of assistance was given (information and 
advocacy were not welcome) but also about who was offering it:
 
[…] the volunteer kitchen was kicked out as well, and the argument was that the mil-
itary kitchen would provide people with hot food, which in the end didn’t happen 
[…]. It was just […] to get the volunteer kitchen out. Our spaces for volunteers were 
continuously being reduced, and […] there was a certain scheme behind this. […] 
there was one scheme stopping the flow of people and another scheme stopping 
the access of volunteers. (Interview 5; 9. 3. 2018)
All “unauthorized” aid was considered increasingly problematic. The authorities 
would not necessarily obstruct the NGOs’ work directly, but by not providing infor-
mation, “or they put additional demands on us to provide non-essential information 
when it came to advocacy for asylum, for example. That way they made it harder for 
us to reach any constructive solutions” (Interview 2; 12. 12. 2018).
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c) Banning access and prohibiting monitoring. In Hungary, the most important hu-
man rights NGO had their 15-year-old contract with the immigration office and the 
police cancelled, including a tripartite agreement on border monitoring with UNHCR. 
For years, they had direct access to any centre in which asylum seekers were located.
All of this ceased in 2017, in the spring, without any explanation or with very illogical 
reasons: for example, that such monitoring was not needed as there is an ombudsman 
and a ‘national preventive monitoring mechanism’, and they are going to these places 
[…]. Every three years they go to a certain centre, […], so it’s a completely different 
way of monitoring. The cancellation was purely political. (Interview 7; 5. 5. 2018)
The authorities also attempted to prevent their lawyers from accessing the transit 
zones, which luckily failed after a petition by the Hungarian Bar Association.
The arguments were nonsensical. The migration office wrote that in 15 years we 
missed the deadline to send the report on these monitoring visits three times by 
couple of days, I think, [and] then that our lawyer behaved badly in court in one case 
[…]. It was a clear decision by the government to ban us from access. (Interview 7; 
5. 5. 2018)
There were only few organizations left that were granted access to the transit zones 
by the state, all of them strictly humanitarian, and most of them religious organiza-
tions, i.e. the so-called Charity Council (consisting of Caritas, the Maltese Order, In-
terchurch Aid, the Red Cross, Reformed Church, Baptist Aid). “There is no exact infor-
mation about what activities each of these organizations perform there. If they have 
access, they do not have the permission to report anything about the situation in the 
transit zones to the public […], everything is actually secret” (Interview 7; 5. 5. 2018).
d) Deterrence and marking of “dangerous” organizations and persons. Before the 
elections in 2018, the Hungarian government informed the public that they had a list 
of about 200 people who are closely connected with George Soros and his network 
and therefore act contrary to the state’s interests. After the elections, the magazine 
Figyelo Review, which is majority-owned by the state, published a list of “suspicious” 
people in an article that ran under a pseudonym:
They copied names from the various websites of the organizations that were con-
sidered a threat to the country, as well as the names of many CEU professors, many 
CEU associates and many civil society organizations – entire lists of people working 
in NGOs; about 200 names were published. (Interview 7; 4. 5. 2018)
While the lists of “corrupt” and “traitorous NGOs” or “murderous abortionist lobbies” 
are also constantly republished by certain media in Slovenia, the Croatian respondent 
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indicated that they suspect that they are under surveillance by various intelligence 
organizations, and that there is a political agenda of several institutions in Croatia to 
discredit their work. “That’s why there aren’t many people who would publicly ex-
pose themselves as working with migrants, since this has become a certain stigma, 
stretching from treason to Islamization and beyond” (Interview 4; 2. 2. 2018).
Yet most of the respondents did not mention particular situations in which their 
work was directly criminalized, although they had heard of or witnessed problems in 
the relationships between the official bodies and the organizations whose work and 
efforts were directly or indirectly accused of being criminal, or denounced by the 
institutions, for example in Sicily (Interview 9; 5. 2. 2018).
In Slovenia in 2015, informal volunteer organizations which did not register with 
the big humanitarian organizations like the Red Cross or Caritas etc. were often pun-
ished for their actions, for example in the space between borders, in no man’s land:
It was said that no one is allowed to offer aid there and at the beginning some peo-
ple who were purely self-organized received fines for misdemeanours. So this was 
criminalized and after that no one in the public supported such actions any more. 
This was how activism was marked as an ugly rebellion against the system and made 
suspect. (Interview 1; 4. 12. 2017)
There is a belief that the work of the NGOs will be further interrogated and discredited 
by the authorities. The Croatian respondent expects the Hungarian scenario to spread:
During our practice of escorting refugees to the police stations […], some of the police 
officers expressed anger and even made threats (such as accusing us of smuggling 
people and that we could potentially expect to be charged). Innumerable times […] 
our colleagues would be exposed to denigration and assaults by high state officials 
in closed rooms. […] The Ministry of the Interior would organize the meeting with us 
and the NGOs providing humanitarian assistance where they would brag about their 
successes and the humanitarian face of their work. (Interview 8; 12. 3. 2018)
e) Direct criminalization of assistance. During the fieldwork early in 2018, the re-
spondents often referred to the draft Hungarian anti-immigration law which would 
directly criminalize the provision of any kind of assistance to migrants, including ba-
sic help for migrants and asylum seekers:
The law requires licenses and if an organization performed activities without a li-
cence, it would be a violation of the law, your tax number would be frozen, […] the 
organization would be banned. In the third part of the law there is a prohibition 
against people coming within eight kilometres of the border between Hungary and 
Serbia. (Interview 7; May 2018)
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The targeted organizations were those that are very active in supporting asylum 
seekers or refugees, in particular human rights defenders: “The law is really made 
in order to get rid of us […] as we are the strongest organization which criticizes the 
acts of the state in the field of human rights” (Interview 7; 4. 5. 2018).
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS: THE CRIMMIGRATION CONTINUUM 
AND THE SHRINKING SPACE OF POLITICS
The five main types of “policing” that we came across in the interviews can be de-
scribed as a continuum3 of the criminalization of the organized and independent pro-
vision of assistance to (“irregular”) migrants. The continuum begins with discursive 
criminalization, involving intimidation and suspicion, as described by Carrera et al. 
(2018). The process is accompanied by public incrimination of non-governmental ac-
tivities through political and media discourses and “semantic drifts” which link them 
to criminals and smugglers, and accuse them of being “pull factors” and “national 
traitors” (Fekete 2018: 67). This includes disinformation, non-factual incrimination of 
allegedly rich and corrupt NGOs, and accusations of being traitors and allies of ter-
rorists who are becoming a part of the bigger picture of the enemy (Fekete 2009), 
which fits well into the simple explanations of conspiracy theories. Our respondents 
have confirmed that alt-right topics are feeding this “news” (see Fekete 2017a: 33). The 
harassment can also go beyond disturbance (Fekete 2017a: 33, Carrera et al. 2018: 27), 
though our respondents luckily did not have experiences with physical attacks.
The second type of policing is characterized by the bureaucratic tightening of 
the space for civic action. Organizations and volunteers are required to register, to 
cooperate, and accept the practices of “knowledge extraction”, such as sharing in-
formation and duty to report (Garelli, Tazzioli 2018: 679) that are carried out by par-
ticipants in the “military-humanitarian war against migrant smugglers” (ibid.). If they 
fail to do so, their activities might be restricted. Suspicion is directed at those who 
are not ready to “go with the flow”, especially more informal organizations which 
do more than just ensuring survival. A difference emerges between two kinds of 
“humanitarianism”: a less formal, more spontaneous and direct type, allowing con-
tact and communication between people, and the strictly organized routine of big 
organizations which provide for basic needs only. Informal, spontaneous groups are 
pushed out of the game. The only participants that are welcomed are those that do 
not engage in advocacy and will not talk much to the people, and will not monitor 
or report the authority’s actions or misconduct.
3 “Continuum of crimmigration” refers to the concept of “continuum of (sexual) violence” (Kelly 
1987) which is suggesting that women experience a whole series of violations of their sexual 
integrity which were not contained within legal parameters that defined sexual offences be-
fore they experience brutal sexual violence.
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The next step is banning access and the possibility of monitoring. The Hungari-
an case has shown that only selected humanitarian organizations get access to mi-
grants. This confirms Fassin’s argument, in his critique of humanitarian reason (Fassin 
2011), about the governing of the unwanted. The radical inequality which forms the 
core of the humanitarian aid discourse is always already implicated in the system 
of governance, which first silences the language of rights and injustices and then 
resorts to pity instead of genuine human solidarity. As confirmed in practice, finally 
even pity, which would give scant alms, is abolished.
While the fifth stage involves the introduction of substantial restrictions, both 
administrative and penal, and attempts to justify the whole process of penalization 
and surveillance by legal means, the fourth stage is even more problematic. Lists of 
suspects create the living targets of governmental and nongovernmental attacks. 
Direct criminalization through legislation is mainly a consequence of previous steps 
which prepare the ground for it.
The notion of the “shrinking space of civil society” (Szuleka 2018) points to the 
developments in the last few decades, in which the governments have been contin-
uously placing increased restrictions on non-governmental actors through policies 
or legal amendments which primarily affect those who are critical of the state’s pol-
icies (ibid.: 11). While the authorities create an unwelcoming political culture and try 
to prevent all elements of spontaneous migration (see Weber in Fekete 2018: 67), 
there is also clear evidence not only of shrinking political space but of attempts at 
destroying any spontaneity, one of the most important elements of human action. 
Aid not only gets regulated, those initiatives which are contrary to the “humanitarian 
missions” of those who are fighting smugglers and quasi-defending the social rights 
standard and sovereignty of the “West” are by definition suspect.
In late August 2018, reports were coming from Hungary that the authorities had 
cut off the distribution of food to some rejected asylum seekers in the transit zones. 
The parliament adopted legislation which is supposed to justify such measures, and 
criminalizes humanitarian activities for migrants, making them punishable by up to a 
year in prison. In Italy as well, a hostile environment is created to prevent both spon-
taneous migrations and any spontaneous initiative to offer aid or solidarize. News 
comes in from the Mediterranean on a daily basis about search and rescue ships that 
are not allowed to enter the ports for weeks.4 “Policing humanitarian borderlands” 
(Aas Franko, Gundhus 2015) has become increasingly anti-human. Yet, as indicated 
at the beginning, this policing is anti-human in a double way, as it not only affects 
4 On 20 November 2018 the Mediterranean rescue ship Aquarius was seized by the Italian au-
thorities, and Doctors Without Borders (MSF), one of the two humanitarian organizations op-
erating on board the ship, was accused of “improperly disposing of the waste accumulated 
during its activities at sea”. MSF rejected the accusations of illegal practices and said that the 
seizure represented “another strike in the series of attacks criminalizing humanitarian aid at 
sea” (Aquarius Rescue Ship Seized 2018).
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the lives and therefore the agency potential of migrants, but increasingly also the 
space and political potentials of the “peoples of Europe”.
The criminalizing of practices of solidarity across the whole of Europe indicates 
that the authorities are trying to limit the autonomous work of organizations by tak-
ing over the majority of activities connected with migrants, trying to discredit their 
work by publicly demonizing them and potentially criminalizing them. Such demo-
nization of people working with migrants is, as our respondent said, “much more 
effective than direct criminalization, since it leads people to giving up or hiding their 
activities”. And this is the ultimate path to dehumanization.
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POVZETEK
KRIMINALIZACIJA “PRO-IMIGRANTSKIH” INICIATIV: REDUCIRANJE 
PROSTORA ČLOVEŠKEGA DELOVANJA
Vlasta JALUŠIČ
Članek naslavlja probleme nadzorovanja, discipliniranja in kriminaliziranja nevlad-
nih akterjev, ki v Sloveniji in štirih sosednjih državah, Avstriji, Madžarski, Hrvaški in 
Italiji, pomagajo nedokumentiran migrantom, prosilcem za azil ali azilantom. Izhaja 
iz konceptualnega okvira krimigracij, ki analizira učinke povezovanja in zlitja kazen-
skega prava in upravljanja migracij. Posledice niso samo kršitve človekovih pravic 
in izključevanje, kriminalizacija prosilcev za mednarodno zaščito, rasno profiliranje, 
nasilje na mejah ter množično umiranje migrantov na poti, ampak tudi nadzor in kri-
minalizacija tistih, ki z njimi solidarizirajo in jim nudijo osnovno humanitarno pomoč, 
kar kaže na proces »dvojne dehumanizacije«.
EU od leta 2002 zapoveduje penalizacijo pomoči nedokumentiranim migran-
tom, ne da bi eksplicitno izključevala humanitarno pomoč. V številih državah EU se 
je – še zlasti po letu 2015 – močno povečalo kazensko sankcioniranje tistih, ki ne 
nudijo samo zagovorništva in informacij, ampak tudi humanitarno pomoč v naj-
elementarnejšem pomenu. Nevladne iniciative so, ker naj bi spodbujale nezakonite 
migracije, obdolžene spodkopavanja interesov in varnosti evropskih držav. Nekatere 
desne vlade ožijo tudi zakonite podlage za delovanje civilne družbe.
Z namenom globljega vpogleda v dinamiko in posledice krimigracijskih pro-
cesov na področju pomoči migrantom je avtorica skupaj s študentko Arijano Radić 
med novembrom 2017 in majem 2018 izvedla deset kvalitativnih intervjujev s člani 
različnih nevladnih organizacij ali bolj neformalno organiziranih iniciativ. Ugotovila 
je, da nadzorovanje in kaznovanje akterjev nevladnih iniciativ, ki poteka kot »krimi-
gracijski kontinuum«, obsega pet tipov praks in politik: diskurzivno kriminalizacijo, 
birokratsko oženje prostora za državljansko delovanje, prepoved dostopa in mož-
nosti za monitoring, zastraševanje in označevanje »nevarnih« organizacij in oseb ter 
neposredne spremembe administrativnih in kazenskih predpisov. Kumulativni učin-
ki omenjenih politik in praks reducirajo prostor političnega, človeškega in humani-
tarnega delovanja ter spontanosti.
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